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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, IV.*
·. (4) The Hn!Jenclmn Clause.

This clause follows the grant, and is one of the most distinctive
features of the modern oil and gas lease. Occasionally the duration of the lease is fixed by the granting clause; some times. by a
miscellaneous provision appearing therein. But generally speaking,
the habendum defines the term of the present-day oil and gas lease.
At any rate a discussion of the legal effect of the habendum clause
whicl1 now characterizes these instruments will involve the treatment of every important question which arises under this heading.
At the outset we should observe that the clause is the direct result
of a natural evolution in the methods and customs of the business. Also that the provision owes its present form to two compelling considerations. The first deals with the situation of the
lessor and the second with the situation of the lessee. Manifestly
a landowner is reluctant to encumber his land for an in<lefinite time
with an unproductive lease. This statement does not imply that
every lease, or even a substantial proportion of the leases taken,
must be developed. The industry could not survive if such were
the requirement. "What is meant is that the lessee shall have a reasonable period ·for exploration, and if within this interval no wells
are drilled or if the wells drilled prove to be nonproductive, then
the lease expires, leaving the lessor free to make such disposition
of his land as he will. Therefore in formulating a provision fixing
the duration of an oil and gas lease the obvious self-interest of the
lessor must be taken into account. On the other hand, the sole
risk of the venture rests with the lessee. He must enter upon a
precarious and uncertain undertaking attended by great finandal
hazard. In such circumstances the duration of the lease must be
sufficiently inviting to induce him to devote his energies and capital
to a business wholly speculative in character. Clearly the answer
to the predicament of the lessee is this: If he find production within the exploratory period then he should have the enjoyment of his
lease during its profitable life. Founded upon these basic considerations the .industry finally has evolved the following habendum
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clause: "To have and to hold said premises for the purposes
aforesaid to and unto the lessee, its successors and assigns, for the
term of five years from date hereof and as much longer tliereaff..:r
as oil or gas shall be produced therefrom in pa'j'ing quantities."
It is to be ~oticed that this clause performs a double function. First
of all it provides that the lease shall expire at the end of a limited
_ term of reasonable duration unless the lessee ·at that time is producing oil or gas in paying quantities. Thus far the provision. is
for the exclusive benefit of the lessor. Supplementing this, how·
ever, is a provision whereby the lessee is vested with the right to hold
the lease as long as oil or gas is fotmd in paying quantities upon
the condition that the lease is made productive during the fixed term.
Therefore the clause serves the peculiar interest of the lessee also.
In order to grasp the exact significance of the clause in the
economy of our subject we must review the conditions which
brought it to its present form.
Broadly speaking, the duration of the oil and gas lease is distinguished by three stages of development. The first period extended from the beginning of the industry until about 188o, and
was characterized chiefly by a lease providing for a fixed and definite term, just as was true of all ordinary mining- leases of that
day. The interval between 1880 and 1900 marked the tram;itiori
from the early type to the modern lease. Since 1900 it .has been
the almost universal custom to employ a lease providing for a
fixed term of limited duration, with a proviso carrying the lease
beyond that term upon the condition that oil or gas is being produced in paying quantities at the end of the stated term. Turning
to the initial period, it was to be expected that during the first two
or three years of its history the inc;lustry shouk! be found groping
for an appropriate and adaptable provision to establish the duration
of its basic contract. At this time there was no pronounced drift
toward uniformity in the tert)1 of the lease, a]though many leases
appeared of record during the interval which were to "continue in
force until annulled by mutual agreement." Such was the form
employed in a lease considered in one of the early Pennsylvania
cases.1 Then again it was provided: "Should oil and salt or
either he found in profitable quantities, lease to be perpetual for all
1

Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. St. 173 (1872).
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purposes therein mentioned." 2 Again: "If oil is found, the right
to pump to continue as long as rent (royalty) is paid."3 Setting
aside these very early grants, the leases of the era fell into three
general classes : First, leases made perpetual by express provision
which were subject to forfeiture within the term if operations were
not commenced within a stipulated time. Second, leases which were
silent as to term, these also providing for the commencement of
operations within a specified period, or the forfeiture of the grant.
In a lease of this class there was no e.."{press provision for the continuance of the grant during the period of production. Although
the point has never been squarely decided, it is probable that this
right would be implied. Such is the intimation in one jurisdiction
at least.• Leases of the two classes just described were exceptional,
however, and the period was definitely characterized by a lease for
a fixed term, usually ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years, although leases for forty, fifty, and even ninety-nine years were by
no means uncommon.r.
"Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St 397 (1869).
"Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164 (1867).
•Tucker v. Watts, 2s Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. (NS) 320 (1903).
• Chicago & Allegheny Co. v. United States Petroleum Co., 57 Pa. St
83 (1868), 20 years Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. St. 297 (1870), so years; Allison's
Appeal, 77 Pa. St 221, (1874), 20 years; Brown v. Vandergrift, 8o Pa. 142
(187s), 20 years; Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. St. Ig8 (I878), 2I years;
Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. St. 307 (1-88o), 20 years; Kitchen v. Smith,
IOI Pa. St 4s2 (I882), IS years; Duke v. Hague, I07 Pa. St. 57 (I884), 20
;rears; Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. St. 590, IS Atl. 6o8 (I888), IS years;
Washington Gas Co. v. Johnson, I23 Pa. St. s76, I6 Atl. 799 (I889), 20 years;
Appeal of Wills, I30 Pa. 222, l~ Atl. 721 (1889), 20 years; Thompson v.
Ridelsperger, I44 Pa. 416, 22 At!. 826 (1891), IS years; Duffield v. Rosenzweig, I44 Pa. s20, 23 Atl. 4 (1891), IS years; McKnight v. Gas Co., 146 Pa.
I8S, 23 Atl. 164 (1892), 20 years; Nesbit v. Godfrey, lS5 Pa. 251, 2s Atl. 621
( I893), 21 years; Sanders v. Sharp, I53 Pa. 5SS, 2s Atl. 524· ( 1893), 20 years;
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, lS2 Pa. St 4s1, 2s Atl. 732 (1893), 20 years; McNish v. Stone, 152 Pa. 4S7, 2s Atl. 732 (1879), 99 years; Williams v. Guffy,
178 Pa. 342; 3S Atl. 87s (I8g6), 20 years; Mathews v. People's Gas Co., I79
Pa. I6S, 36 Atl. 216 (1897), 20 years; Gale v. Oil Run Pet Co., 6 W. Va.
200 (1873), 20 years; Wood Co. Pet. Co. v. Transportation Co., 28 W. Va.
210, (1886), IS years; Guffy v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, I I S. E. 754. (18go), 20
years; Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 38s, 12 S. E. s22 (I8go), 20 years; Hukill
v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, IS S. E. lSI (I892), 20 years; Hukill v. Guffy, 37
W. Va. 42S, I6 S. E. S44 (I892), 20 years; Haskell v. Sutton, S3 W. Va. 2o6,
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When we consider this type of lease in the light of our present
kn°'•:ledge of the subject it is at once evident that a lease terminating on a definite day in the future is not adapted to the peculiar
nature of the business. We 1.-now now that a lease will continue
to produce oil at a profit for a much longer period than the fifteen,
twenty or twenty-five year term provided here. Today wells are
still in operation in Pennsylvania which have been producing for fifty
years. Wells in that district which have produced for forty years
are the rule rather than the exception. In Ohio and West Virginia
there are properties which have been producing for thirty or
thirty-five years. Even in the more recent oil-producing states
there are wells which are from fifteen to twenty years old and
which are now being operated at a substantial profit. But manifestly these things were unknown to the early operators. Tc them
the whole enterprise was a precarious experiment at best. It was
problematical whether the fields then in operation would ever produce enough petroleum to put the business upon a permanent basis. Furthermore, the vision of these men did not extend beyond
the few districts which were then productive. Even the question
of an enduring market was shrouded in uncertainty. These conditions in themselves implied a s~ort-term lease. Moreover, it was
universally believed that an oil property would exh:.).ust rapidly, and
in the light of the experi~nce then possessed by persons engaged
in the business this conclusion had some foundation. The area of
a lease was decidedly restricted, which fact under ordinary circumstances would enable the lessee to recover the oil content of his
property within a much shorter period than was true of the more
extensive leases which charaderized the industry later. Again, the
daily production of the wells was small in comparison with later
discoveries, which indicated the probable exhausti'on of a property
within a comparatively brief period. Above everything the capacity of petroleum to migrate underground was greatly exaggerated
in the popular mind. It was believed that one well would drain
the oil from a large area speedily and completely. These consider-·
-44 S. E. 533 (1903), 20 years; Van Etten v. Kelly, 66 Ohio St. 6o5, 64 N. E.
56o (1902), ·15 years; Baumgardner v. Browning, J2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 73
(1896), 20 years; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584 (1902),
40 years•.
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ations induced the early operators to commit the industry to a
lease of limited duration.
When these leases began to expire, however, it became increasingly evident, that a lease of this type was not adapted to the enterprise. The average lessee would find himself in this predicament.
Two or three years before the termination of his lease the property
would be pr~ducing oil in substantial quantities and would give
every promise of producing for an in~efinite period in the future,-·
at any rate for a considerable length of time beyond the fixed term
of the lease. There would be no provision for renewal, and accordingly the lessee would ·be faced by the unhappy alternative of
surrendering a valuable property or of negotiating a renewal.
Usually if this concession were obtainable under any circumstances
it would J;ie at a price equivalent to the full value of the lease-hold
at the time. In other words, the lessee was put to· the necessity of
purchasing a property which had been developed at his sole risk
and expense. Manifestly this situation alone was sufficient to convince the industry that a lease effective throughout the period of
production was an indispensable requisite. But experience had
revealed other compelling objections to a lease of this character.
It had been demonstrated that the practical method of operating
an oil property was -this. First, the lessee should continue to drill
wells as long as paying wells were found until the property was
completely developed. As a result, both parties realized the greatest possible profit from the venture. Secondly, when paying wells
were found on adjoining lands the lessee should offset the same
promptly in order to protect the leased premises from drainage.
But a lease of fixed duration was not adapted to this plan of development. Here a stage would be reached toward the end of the
grant when the lessee could not afford to drill additional 'Wells
even to protect the land from drainage because the production therefrom within the remaining term of the lease would not be sufficient to pay the cost of drilling. The result was inevitable. During the last two or three years of the lease the lessee would refrain
from all drilling operations, contenting himself with the production
from the wells drilled previously. On the other hand a lease effective as long as oil or gas should be found justified an uninterrupted course of development, .dependent only upon the result
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achieved. A further circumstance which was calculated to Induce
the lessors of that period to renounce the lease of fixed duration
was this. As a rule,· the removal of the casing from an oil well
necessitates the abandonment of the well. Most of these early
leases by express stipulation gave the lessee the right to remove
the casing from all wells at the termination of the lease. Ev~n in
the absence of a provision of this character it was the rule in Pennsylvania that the casing in a well was a trade fixture which the
lessee had the right to withdraw upon the termination of the lease. 6
Occasionally where the parties were unable to agree upon a renewal the lessee would permit the lessor to purchase the casing at
cost, but in frequent instances a lessee would draw the casing from
his wells at the expiration of his lease, yielding the lessor a: dismantled, or perhaps valueless, property. These and numerous other
practical considerations unnecessary to mention here, brought both
lessors and lessees to the realization that the instrument which was
peculiarly adapted to the prosecution of the business was a lease to
continue in force as long as oil or gas should be found in paying
quantities.
This brings us to the second stage in the development of the
term of the oil and gas lease, namely, the transition period. In the
late seventies leases for a definite term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas should ·be produced in paying quantities began
to appear of record in the oil districts of Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio, but the first lease of this character considered in a
reported case was maoe in I~8I.7 Here the habendum clause provided: "To have and to hold the same for the term of twelve
years from this date, or flS lon;g as oil is found in paying quantities."
Between I88o ·and I89<> this type of lease was in somewhat general
use in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana,8 although
•Shetlar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 569, 33 Atl. 95 (1895); Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899) ; Sattler v. Opperman, 47 Pittsburgh
Legal Journal, 205 (1899); Sattler v. Opperman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 32
(1900); Forest Oil Co. v. Hart, 50 Pittsburgh Legal Journal, 17 (1902);
Smith v. Hickman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 ( 1900).
.
'Eaton v. Alleghany Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (18go).
a Agerter v. Vandergrift, 138 Pa. 576, 21 Atl. 202 (1891); Smiley v.
Western Pa. Nat. ·Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576, 21 Atl. I (18g1); Springer v.
Citizens Nat. Gas Co., 145 Pa. Ct. 430, 22 Atl. 986 (18g1); Heintz v. Shortt,
149 Pa. St 286 24 Atl. 316 (1892); Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co., 152 Pa.
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leases of fixed duration were by no means uncommon during this
interval.11 In the succeeding decade, however, it became the almost
St. 48, 2s Atl. 232 (1892); Gibson v. Oliver, 158 Pa. St. 277, 27 Atl. g61
(18g3) ; Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, 16! Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl. 1004 (1894) ;
Hooks v. Forst,--I6S Pa. St. 238, 30 Atl. 846 (1895); Shellar v. Shivers, 171
Pa. St. s6g, 33 Atl. 95 ( 1895) ; Double v. Union Heat & Light Co., 172 Pa.
St. 388, 33 Atl. 694 ( 1896) ; Stage v. Boyer, 183 Pa. St. soo, 38· Atl. 1035
(1898); Akin v. Marshall Oil Co., 188 Pa. St. 602, 41 Atl. 748 (1898); Burton
v. Forest Oil Co., 204, Pa. St. 349, 54 Atl. 266 (1903) ; Schaupp v. Hukill, 34
W. Va. 37S, 12 S. E. sor (1890); Crawford v. Ritchie, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S.
E. 220 (1897); Crawford v. Belleview Nat. Gas Co., 183 Pa. St. 227, 38 Atl.
S95 (18g7); Jackson v. O'Hara, 183 Pa. St. 233, 38 Atl. 624 (1897); Core
v. New York Pet. Co., 52 W. Va. 76, 43 S. E. 128 (1902); Toothman v.
Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907); Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio
Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892); Baker v. Stow, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 489
(18g2); Miller v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 47S (1892);
Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas. Co. v. Whitacre, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.)
sos (1892); Hollister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) s86
(1892); Emerine v. Steel, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 381 (1894); Northwestern
Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Davis, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. SSl (18gs); Stahl v. Van
Vleck, S3 Ohio St. 136, 41 N. E. 3S (18Qs); Simon v. Northwestern Ohio
Nat. Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (1896); Blair v. Northwestern Nat.
Gas. Co., 12.0hio Cir. Ct. Rep. 78 (18g6); Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford,
SS Ohio St. 161, 44 N. E. 1093 (18g6); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., S7 Ohio St.
u8, 48 N. E. s02 (1897); Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68
Ohio St. 2S9, 67 N. E. 494 (1903); Ev.ans v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., Ind. Sup. - - , 29 N. E. 398 (18g1); Indianapolis Nat.· Gas Co. v. Kibbey~
l3S Ind. 3S7, 3!' N. E. 392 (18g3); Edmonds v. Mounsey, lS Ind. App. 399,
44 N. E. 1g6 (18g6); Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Teters, IS Ind. App. 47S, 44
N. E. 549 (18g6); American1 Window Glass Co. v. Williams, 30 Ind. App.
68s, 66 N. E. 912 (1903); Indiana Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. Grainger, 33 Ind.
App. S59, 70 N. E. 395 (1904).
•wmiams v. Guffy, 178 Pa. St. 342, 35 Atl. 875 (1896); Mathews v.
People's Gas Co., 179 Pa. St. 165, 36 Atl. 216 (18g7); Washington Nat. Gas
Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. St. 576, 16 Atl. 799 (188g); Appeal of Wills, 130
Pa. St. 222, 18 Atl. 721 (188g); Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. St. 590, 15 Atl.
6o8 (1888); Thompson v. Ridelsperger, 144 Pa. 416, 22 Atl. 826-827 (18g1);
Duffield v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. 520, 23 Atl. 4 (18g1)-; Nesbitt v. Godfrey,
155 Pa. 251, 25 Atl. 621 (18g3); Sanders v. Sharp, 153 Pa. 555, 25 Atl. 524
(18g3); Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (18g3); Guffy
v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, I I S. E 754 (1890); Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va.
385, 12 S. E. 522 (18go); Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S. E. 151 (1892);
Hukill v. Guffy, 37 W. Va. 425, 16 S. E. 544 (18g2); Haskell v. Sutton, 53
W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533 (1903); Van Etten v. Kelly, 66 Ohio St. 6o5, 64
N. E. 56o (1902); Bau~gardner v. Browning, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 73 (18g6).
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universal practice to take leases effective for the producing life of
the property. Although the oil industry had thus achieved its own
objective it was still reluctant to consent to the type of lease which
the peculiar situation of the lessor required, namely, a lease expiring
at the end of a fixed term of reasonable duration unless made productive within that period. Three types of leases now came into
use which were designed to enable the lessee· to hold the lessor's
land for a long term or for an indefinite period without development. The first leases of this description were for terms ranging
from fifteen to twenty-five years and as long thereafter as oil or
gas should be found. 1<> As a rule a lease 9f this description would
contain a provision vesting the lessee with the right to hold the
grant for the entire fixed term of fifteen or twenty-five years, as
the case might be, without development and upon. the payment of a
periodical rental only. If production were found during the exploratory period, however, the lease would remain in force as long
as that condition continued. In other words, the only change occurring here was that the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas
shall be found in paying quantities" was added to the limited habendum clause of the fifteen or twenty-five year leases which were
then passing into disuse. This innovation accomplished nothing in
the direction of reducing the length of the exploratpry period. On
the other hand leases of this description did :qot meet the design
of the industry completely, because in many cases lessees were bound
to the payment of a rental for a long term regardless of the probable value of the property for the purposes of the lease. The situation resulted in an experiment by means of which the industry
sought to achieve a twofold object: .First, a lease effective for the
purpose of exploration as long as the lessee might elect to pay the
,. Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564 (1896); Calhoun v. Neely,
201 Pa. 97, 50 Atl. 967 (1902); Wilson v. Philadelphia Co., 210 Pa. 484, 6o
Atl. 149 (1904); Mcintosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 Atl. 949 (1912); Hukill
v. Guffy, 37 W. Va. 425, 16 S. E. 544 (18g2); Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va.
252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897); Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co .. 51
W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902); South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va.
720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913); Freeman v. McKay, - W. Va.-, 98 S. E. 263
(1919); Siler v. Globe Window Glass Co., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 284 (1900);
Munsey v. Marnett Oil & Gas Co. (Tc..'C. Civ. App.), - Tex. -, 199 S. W.
686 (r917).
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stipulated rental,. the lessee having the right to retire from the contract when the value of the property no longer justified such payment; secondly, in the event production were realized it was intended that the lease should remain in force as long as oil or gas
· was produced in paying quantities. The consequence of a lease of
this character is immedi:itely appare.nt. It enabled the lessee to
hold the lessor's lands indefinitely without development. In these
circumstances two types of leases Caine into use. In the one case
the habendum clause took this form: "To have and to hold the
above premises unto the parties of the second part, their heirs and
assigns, on the following conditions." 11 No term was stated but
the rental clause was so phrased as to permit the lessee to hold the
lease indefinitely by the payment of the periodical rental. It was
also provided that if production were developed during the indefinite term, that is, while the lessee was holding the grant by the payment of rental, the instrument should remain in force as long as oil
or gas was produced in paying quantities. This form came into
rather general use in West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana.n In the
other type the habendum clause was in this language: "'To haYe1
and t0 hold said premises for the term of ten years, or thereafter
while oil or gas is produced in paying quantities or the rental
paid.'~ 1 • It is to be noticed that the happening of either one of two
conditions would carry the lease beyond the fixed term: First, the
finding of production within that period, ·or, secondly, the payment
of the stipulated rental. In other words, the legal effect of this
lease was identical with the one involved in Lowther Oil Co. v.
Guffey. The form was very generally employed in Pennsylvania,
West Virginia and Indiana.1' Neither of these leases withstood
11

Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffy, 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. 101 (1902).
uweaver v. Akin. 48 W. Va. 456, 37 S. E. 6oo (I!)OC>); Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1917); Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 220,
83 S. E. g83 (1914); Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E.
1075 (1916); Central Ohio Gas Co. v. Eckert, 70 Ohio St. 127, 71 N. E. 281
(1904); Carr v. Huntington Light Co., 33 Ind. App. I, 70 N. E. 552 (1904);
Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Leer, 34 Ind. App. 61, 72 N. E. 283 (1904); Diehl
v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 539 (1892), 20 0. C. D. 750.
.....t' Burton v. Forest Oil Co., 204 Pa. St. 349, 54 Atl. 266 ( 1903).
"Letherman v. Oliver, 151 Pa. St. 646, 25 ,Atl. 309 (1892) ; Western Pa.
Gas Co. v. George. 16x Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl.- 1004 (1894); Summerville v:
:\poll-. Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

the scrutiny of the courts. The rule was everywhere adopted that
when a lessee had the apparent right to hold a lease indefinitely
upon the payment of a, rental alone the lessor might demand a well,
give the lessee a reasonable time to perform, and failure to drill was
ground for the cancellation of the lease.15 This judicial announcement brought the industry to the adoption of the habendum clause
which now characterizes the oil and gas lease. Otherwise stated,
when the courts decided that a lessee could not hold his lease indefinitely by the mere payment of a rental, the only alternative was
Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909); Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 24J Pa.
128, 89 Atl. 823 (1914); McKean Nat. Gas Co. v. Wolcott, 254 Pa. 323, g8
Atl. 955 (1916); Schaupp v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 375, 12 S. E. 501 (18go);
Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (18g6); Myers v. Garnahan,
61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134 (1907) ; Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S.
E. 762 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836
(1909); American Window Glass Co. v. Williams 30 Ind. App. 685, 66 N. E.
912 (1903),; Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Grainger, 33 Ind. App. 559, 70 N. E.
395 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Worth, 163 Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904);
Consumers' Gas Co. v. Ink, 163 Ind. 174· 71 N. _E. 477 (1904); LaFayette
Gas Co. v. Kelsay, 164 Ind. 563, 74 N. E: 7 (1905); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v.
Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N. E. 520 (1go6); Campbell v. Rocle Oil Co., 15:::
Fed. 191 (1907).
.
,. Consumers' Gas Co. v. Crystal Wirn;Iow Glass Co., ~63 Ind. 190, 7:> N.
E. 366 (1904) ; Consumers' Gas Co. v. Howard, 163 Ind. 170, 71 N. E. 493
(1904); Logansport Gas Co. v. Seegar, 165 Ind. 1, 74 N. E. 500 (1905);
New American Oil Co. v. Wolff, 166 Ind. 704 76 N. E. 255 (1906); Puritan
Oil Co. v. Myers, 39 Ind. App. 6g5, 80 N. E. 851 (1907); Consumers' Gas
Co. v. Ink, 168 Ind. 174 71 N. E. 477 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Worth,
163 Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904); LaFayette Gas Co. ·v. Kelsay, 164 Ind.·
563, 74 N. E. 7 (1905) ;·Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N.
E. 520 (1go6); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat.. Gas. Co.,, 37
Ind. App. 439, 76 N. E. 10o6 (1906) ; Campbell v. Rock Oil Co., 151 Fed.
191 (1907); Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916);
Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1918).
· These cases were decided on the theory "that where the lessee has the
right to hold the lease indefinitely by the pa:rment of a rental, the courts
will imply a condition for the development of the lease, this to be put into
operation upon the lessor's demand foi: a well.. within a reasonable time,
and failure on part of th~ lessee to comply.
In Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896), the habendum clause read: "To have and to hold the said -premises for said purposes during and until the full term of two years next ensuing, and as much
longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities, or the rental paid therevn."
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to provide that the lease should terminate at the end of a definite
term of. reasonable duration unless production were found meanwhile.
Having traced the evolution of the habendum clause to its
present form, a critical examination of the modern clause becomes
necessary. .i\t the beginning there was no uniformity in the phraseology of the provision.16 Now, however, the habendum clause
In order to strike down the right of the lessee to hold the lease beyond the
two-year term by the paymt>nt of rental, the court construed the word "or'' as
"and," stating that the word "rental" as here used meant the royalty provided
for in the lease in the event of production and that the term did not refer to
the commutation money payalile during the exploratory period.
To the same effect: Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, l6I Pa. St. 47, 28
Atl. 1004 (1894); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co.,
supra.
1
• "To have and to hold the same unto the lessee for the term of two
years from date and as long thereafter as oil or gas is found in paying
quantities, not exceeding in the whole the term of twenty-five years.'' Brown
v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N. E. 76 (1902).
"To have and to hold the said premises * * * for, during and until the
full term of fifteen years next ensuing, with the right of renewal thereafter
so long as oil shall continue to be found in sufficient quantities to operate."
Heintz v. Shortt, 149 Pa. St. 286, 24 Atl. 316 (1892).
"Three years and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall continue to be
found in paying quantities." McMillan v. Philadelphia Co., 159 Pa. St. 142,
28 Atl. 220 (1893).
"To have and to hold said premises for and during the term of one
year from this date * * * It is further agreed th~t should a paying production of oil or gas be found on said land within said term of one year, the
lessor agrees to extend this lease from year to year so long as said production continues." Crawford v. Bellevue Gas Co., 183 Pa. St. 22'/, 38 Atl. 595
(1897).
"Ninety days from d;ite and as much longer as oil or gas is found,
operated and produced in paying quantities." Dettor v. Holland, 57 Ohio
St. 492, 49 N. E. 69o (1898).
"Contract to commence at and run from date of signing, and terminate
whenever, in the assumption of the lessee, sufficient oil or gas cannot be
produced to use the same profitably for mercantile purposes." American
Steel Co. v. Tate, 33 Ind. App. 504, 71 N. E. 189 (1904).
''Two years, or for such time as oil or gas shall be found in paying
quantities." Iams v. Carnegie Nat. Gas Co., 194 Pa. St. 72, 45 Atl 54 (1899).
"This conitract shall be deemed to commence from date of signing, and
shall be deemed to have terminated whenever natural gas ceases to be used
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usually assumes the form originally set forth in this paper, the
only variation being that in some leases the grant will be for a
definite term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is found
in paying quantities, while in others the lease will be for a definite
term of years and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be produced
in paying quantities. 17 The courts attribute the same legal effect
to these two phrases. For simplicity of stateriient the original or
definite term of the modern lease will .be designated here as the
"exploratory period." Obviously the length of this period wiil depend upon :the peculiar condition of the property at the time the
lease is made. If the land is in the neighborhood of production or
if other circumstances indicate that the tract is oil-bearing, it is the
natural disposition of the lessor to restrict the duration of the exploratory period. Accordingly we find that in the developed fields
the duration of the fixed term ranges from sixty days in extreme
cases to two years.18 This means, of course, that a lease of this
character terminates within the short term set forth therein uniess
generally for manufacturing purposes." Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Kibbey,
135 Ind. 357, 35 N. E. 392 (1893).
"Five years from date of lease and as much longer thereafter as oil or
gas is found therein or said premises developed or operated." Doornbos v.
Warwick, 104 Kan. 102, 177 Pac. s2i (1919).
"Five years from date of lease and as much longer as the rent for failure to commence operations is paid, and as long after the commencement
of operations as said premises are operated for the production of oil and
gas." :Myers v. Carnahan, 61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134 (1907).
' 1Five years from date of lease or as long as oil or gas shall be found
in paying quantities or the said second party or its assigns continue to
operate a pipeline over or through the land." Simon v. Northwestern Ohio
Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6).
11
Jamisoru v. Carnegie Nat. Gas. Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87 S. E. 451 (1915);
Core v. New York Pet. Co., 52 \V. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128 (1903); Balfour v.
Russell, 167 Pa. St. 287, 31 Ail. 570 ( 1895) ; Hooks v. Forst, 165 Pa. 238, 30
Atl. 846 (1895); Smiley v. Gallagher, 164 Pa. St. 493, 30 Atl. 713 (1894);
Gibson v. Oliver, 158 Pa. 277, 27 Atl. g61 (1893); Marshall v. Forest Oil Co.,
198. Pa. 83, 47 Atl. 927 (1901); Dinsmoor v. Combs, 177 Ky. 740, 198 S. W.
58 (1917) ; Jamison Coal Co. v. Carnegie Gas Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87 S. E.
451 (1915).
In the following cases '1:he leases involved were effective for a period
of sixty days from date and as long thereafter as oil or gas shoulci he pro··
duced:
18
Simon v. Northwestern Gas Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (1896);
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the property is made productive within t11at time. On the other
hand, where wildcat territory is involved, the lessee wili not agree
to a short exploratory period. In such circumstances it is usual
to provide for a lease effective 'for a term of five or ten years and
as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be found, the lessee having
the right to !Ilaintain the lease for the original term by the payment of a periodical rental, and the alternative right to surrender
the instrument when the prospective value of the lands covered
thereby no longer justifies the payment of the prescribed rental.
With these basic considerations in mind we are brought to the
task of determining the legal effect of this provision in its several
phases. First of all it must be understood that we are not dealing
with the abandonment, forfeiture, or surrender of an oil and gas
lease at some period within the life of th~ instrument. All these
matters will be treated elsewhere. The sole question which concerns us here is the divestiture of the lessee's title by the e.~piration
of the term provided for in the lease. Before approaching the
broader aspects of the subject certain incidental questions should
be disposed of. Usually the extension clause assumes one of these
Duffield v. Russell, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 266 (1899); Murdock-West Co. v.
Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514. 69 N. E. g84 (1904).
Ninety days and as long thereafter: Evans v. Consumers' Gas Co., Ind.-, 29 N. E. 3g8 (18g1); Dettor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E.
6go (18g8).
.
Six months and as long thereafter: Consumers· Gas Co. v. Worth, 163
Ind. 141, 71 N. E. 489 (1904); Consumers' Gas Co. v. Ink, 168 Ind. 174. 71
N. E. 477 (1904).
One year and as long thereafter: Crawford v. Bellevue Gas Co., 183
Pa. St. 227, 38 Atl. 595 (18g7); Noble v. Western Pa. Gas Co., 255 Pa. 512,
100 Atl. 48o (1917); Updegraff v. Blue Creek Coal Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81
S. E. 1050 (1914); Horse Cn:ek Coal Co. v. Trees, 75 W. Va. 559, 84 S.'E.
376 (1915); Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., &i W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 47.2
(1917); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, - W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919);
Harrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892); Chaney v. Ohio Oil
Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 6g N. E. 477 (1904).
Two years and as long thereafter: Midland Gas Co. v. Jefferson County
Gas Co., 237 Pa. 602, 85 Atl. 853 (1912); Gillespie v. American Zinc Co.,
247 Pa. 222, 93 Atl. 272 (1915); Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232,
38 S. E. 662 (1901); Core v. New York Pet Co., 52 W. Va. 27, 43 S. E. 12!!
(1903); Petty v. United Fuel Co., 76 W. Va. 268, 85 S. E . .523 (1915); Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E. 344 (1901).
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forms: "As long thereafter.as oil or gas is found in paying quantities,'' "as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities," "as long thereafter as oil or gas is prod·uced-." The rule is
settled that the two clauses first mentioned are identical in their
legal effect.10 On the other hand the early decisions in West Virginia inti~te a distinction between the first two clauses and the
last, which omits the phrase "paying quantities."~0 Later, however,
the West Virginia court said: "'Produced', 'produced in paying
quantities', 'found in paying quantities' must mean about the same
thing, else substance will be subordinated to shadow or mere technicality."21 It is held that the "thereafter" clause determines the
character of the estate created by an oil and gas lease. 2 !) On principle, however, the clause simply enlarges or extends an estate already created. This concl~sion is also supported by authority. 23 In
New York the court declares that the words "as long thereafter as
oil or gas shall be found" are words of limitation.u The validity
of the clause under consideration is seldom challenged. In a Kansas case the contention was made that the "thereafter" clause ren"'South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1912);
Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514, 6g N. E. 984 (1904); Young
v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45 Atl. 12I (1899).
•Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909);
McGraw Oil Co.
Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). Contra:
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 26o Ill. 16g, 102 N. E. 1043 (1913).
11
South Penn Oil. Co. v. Snodgrass, supra. For an interesting discussion
of the meaning of the term "found" as here used, see Smith v. Hickman, 14
Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 (1900).
"'Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397 (186g). Here a similar
provision was involved and the lessee was producing oil in paying quantities.
It was held that the clause created a perpetual license. In Bruner v. Hicks,
230 Ill. 556, 82 N. E. 888 (1907), jt was held that the use of the clause "as
tong thereafter as oil or gas shall be found" had the effect of vesting the
lessee with a freehold interest because of . the indefinite and indeterminate
period provided for in the grant.
•South Penn Oil. Co. v. Snodgrass, supra; Barbot{r, Stedman Co. v.
Tompkins, 81 W. Va. u6, 93 S. ·E. 1038 (1917); Chaney v. Ohio & Indiana
Oil Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 6g N. E. 477 (1904); Johnson v. Armstrong, 81
W. Va. 399. 94 S. E. 753 (1918); Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 AtL
446 (1899).
.
"'Eaton v. Alleghany Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (189c>); Conkling v. Krandusky, II2 N. Y. Supp. 13 (1908).

v.
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dereci the lease void on the grotl1'd of uncertainty. The court, in
overruling this objection, said: "We have not been referred to any
adjudicated cases involving the validity of gas or oil contracts like
the one at bar where leases containing such stipulations have been
held void for uncertainty.25 The only other case where the validey.
of the oil and gas lease has been assailed on account of the duration
of the term where it is contended that the lease violates the rule
against perpetuities. On principle this assault is justifiable only
in those jurisdictions which hold that no estate vests until discovery, or that a new and additional estate vests upon cEscovery.
Moreover, the doctrine if sustainable there would be limited to the
so-called "no term" lease which the lessee has the right to maintain
indefinitely by the payment of a rental, or to a lease of fixed term
extending beyond the period of twenty-one years. In this respect
the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas shall ·be found in paying
quantities" is not involved. Even in the case of a "no term" lease
it is held that the instrumt:nt does not violate the rule against perpetuities because the lessor may refuse the rental, demand a well,
and forfeit the lease if the well is not drilled within a reasonable
time. 211 No American. court has held that an oil and gas lease is
invalid merely for the reason that it is effective for a definite term
and as long thereafter as oil or gas shall be found.
Dismissing these preliminary matters, the principal question
involved in the present inquiry may be thus stated. When and
under what conditions does a lease of this character terminate?
As a practical matter the modern habendum clause is important in.
the following circumstances: First, where the lessee fails to develop the property in any manner during the exploratory period;
second, when the well or wells drilled by him during that time are

is

'"Dickey v. Coffeyville Brick Co., 6g Kan. 1o6, 76 Pac. 3g8 (1904). But
see United Fuel Supply Co. v. Volcanic Oil & Gas Co., 20 Ont. Weekly Rep.
78, where a tease of this type was involved, and where the court, denominating the instrument an option, held that it was invalid on the ground of
remoteness.
"Wilson v. Reserve Gas. Co., 78 W. Va. 329. 88 S. E. 1075 (1916); Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1918). For an interesting
discussion of this question by Professor James W. Simonson, of the West
Virginia University, see 25 WF.sT VIRGINIA LAW QuARTF.RLY, p. 30; also note
relating to the same subject, 25 WF.sT VIRGINIA LAW QUARTF.RJ.Y, p. 236.
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non-productive; third, when the well or wells drilled during the
exploratory period cease to produce before the end of the definite
term. Ignoring the possjbility of the forfeiture, abandonment, or
surrender of the grant within the definite term, the question upon
principle is susceptible of but one· answer. The plain intent of the
clause is that the lease shall terminate absolutely upon the happening of any one of the three contingencies just mentioned. Su~h,
precisely, is the universal holding of the courts.27 It is equally
zr Conkling v. Krandusky, II2 N Y. Supp. 13; Eaton v. Alleghany Gas
Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. g81 (1890); Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 56g,
33 Atl. 95 (1895); Riddle v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 30, 23 Atl. 241 (18g2);
Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George, 161 Pa. St. 47, 28 Atl. 1004 (1894); Cassell
v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 4.¢ (1899); Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil
Co., 152 Pa. St. 48, 25 Atl. 232 (1892); Double v. Union Light & Heat Co.,
172 Pa. St. 388, 33 Atl. 694 (18g6); Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St.
243, 45 Atl. 121 (1899); Smith v. Hickman, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 46 (1900);
Balfour v. Russell, 167 Pa. St. 287, 31 Atl. 570 (1895) ; Summerville v.
Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Foster v. Elk Fork Oil Co.,
90 Fed. 178 (18g8); ~arnsdall v. Boley, II9 Fed. 191 (1902); Bettman v.
Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 2jl (18g6); McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy,
65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W.
Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); Barbour, Stedman Co. v. Tompkins, 81 W.
Va. n6, 93 S. E. 1038 (1917); Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Gr~enleaf, - W. Va.
- , 99 S. E. 274 (1919); Ash Grove Lime Co. v. Chanute Brick Co., 100
Kari. 547, 164 Pac. lo87 (1917); Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -;
"189 Pac. 920 (1920); Buffalo Valley Oil Co. v. Jones, 75 Kan. 18, 88 Pac.
537 (1907); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil Co., 85 Kan. 483, n8 Pac. 54 (19n);
Roach v. Junction Oil Co., 75 Okla. 220, 179 Pac. 934 (1919); Strange v.
Hicks, I I Okla. App. 369, 188 Pac. 347 (1920); Dickey v. Coffeyville Brick
Co., 6g Kan. 106, 76 Pac. "3g8 (1904) ; Simon v. Northwestern Ohio Gas Co.,
12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6) ; B.rown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. .r;07, 63 N.
E. 76 (1902); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6g Ohio St. 514 69 N. E. 98-t
(1904)·; Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, ·49 N. E. 690 (18g8); Northw.estem Oh,io Nat. Gas Co. v. Whitacre, 30 C. C. Rep. 737 (1892); Northwestern Ohio Gas Co. v. Tiffin, 59 Ohio St. 420, 54 N. E. 77 (1899); Poe a:.
Ulrey, 233 Il1. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (1go8) ; Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., z6o lll. 169,
102 N. E. 1043 (1913); Chaney v. Ohio Oil Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 69 N. E.
4'17 (1904); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 74 N. E. 551
(1905); American Window Glass Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co., 37 Ind. App.
439, 76 N. E. IOo6 (1906); Indiana Nat. Gas Co. v. Pierce, 34 Ind. App. 523,
68 N. E. 6g1 (1903), 73 N E. 194 (1905); Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140
La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917); Prowant v. Sealy, II Okla. App. 10, 187 Pac.
235 (1920); Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 429 (1905); Hot-
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clear ·both upon principle and under the authorities just cited, that
if the lessee is producing oil or gas in paying quantities at the ex-

piration of the definite term, the lease shall remain in force as long
as that condition continues. Thus, in Brown v. Fowler 28 it is said:
"This clause means that the term of the lease is limited to two
years (the definite or exploratory term), but that if within the
two years oil or gas shall be found, then the lease shall run as much
longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities;
but if no oil or gas shall be found within the two years, the lease
shall, at the end of the two years, terminate, not by forfeiture, but
by expiration of terms; and after the expiration of said two years
no further drilling can be done under the lease." In an Indiana
case it is said: "Such a clause will be construed as meaning that if
the term is enlarged it must be ·by the production of gas or oil in paying quantities within the term specified; if such a contingency does
not happen then the lease expires and is of no avail to either
party."29 In Murdock-West Co. v. Logan29 a the court observes:
"In order to continue their lease beyond the stipulated time it was
necessary for the lessees to find oil in paying quantities. For this
purpose it was not sufficient to complete a well having some indications of oil or a well which might be developed into a well producing oil in paying quantities, but the lessees must actually find
oil in paying quantities, and this is the same as obtaining and producing it in paying quantities."
Thus far the decisions are in complete harmony, but there are
other situations of almost equal importance which evidence a certain divergence in the adjudicated cases. The general rule is this.
Where the fixed term has expired and where the lessee seeks to
hold the leased premises under the extension clause he not only
must be engaged in producing oil or gas but the production must be
in paying quantities.30 This necessitates that we ascertain the exact
meaning of the phrase "paying quantities" as employed here. In
lister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 586 (1892); Hazel Green
Oil Co. v. Collier, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 495, no S. W. "343 (1go8); American
Window Glass Co. v. Williams, 30 Ind. App. 685, 66 N. E. 912 (1903).
"Brown v. Fowler, supra .
.. Chaney v. Ohio & Indiana Oil Co., s11pra.
"'a Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, supra.
:i> See cases cited under note 27.
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the law of oil and gas the term has two distinct meanings. It frequently happens that a lessee will agree to proceed with the drilling
of the property as long as the wells encountered produce oil in paying quantities. Then again there is always an implied condition or
covenant in the lease which requires the lessee to offset paying wells
on adjoining lands. In either case the rule is settled that the well
must be of such capacity as to reasonably insure a profit over the
-original cost of drilling and equipping the well, and also a profit over
the expense of operation. In other words, two factors are taken into
consideration: first, the initial cost of the well, and secondly, the
cost of operation.31 On the other hand where the term appears in
the habendum clause or in any other provision establishing the duration of the lease, the initial cost of the well is disregarded and the
lessee has the right to hold the lease as long as the well or wells pay
a profit, however small, over the cost of operation.32 In Young v.
Osborn v. Finkelstein, -· Ind. -, 126 N. E. II (1920) ; Ohio Fuel Supply Co. v. Shilling, - Ohio-, 127 N. E. 873 (1920); Hart v. Standard Oil
Co., - La.-, 84 So. 169 (1920); Aycock v. Paraffine Oil Co., - Tex.-.
210 S. W. 851 (1919); Ardizzone v. Archer, - Okla. -, 178 Pac. 263
(191;}); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, - Okla.-, 188 Pac. lo69 (I<)20);
Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, - Okla.-, l7i Pac. 104 (1918); Manhattan Oil
Co. v. Carrell, 164 Ind. 526, 73 N. E. lo84 (1905).
In Montgomery v. Hickok, 188 111. App. 348 (1914), however, it is held
that where a sum of money was payable upon the completion of a paying
well, the cost of drilling and equipping the well is not to be taken into consideration.
But where the parties define the term "paying quantities" as meaning a
well of a designated capacity, this definition must control. McLean v. Kishi
(Tex. Civ. App.), 17;:1 S. \V. 502 (1915).
~Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899); Young Y.
Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45 Atl 121 (1899); South Penn Oil Co. v.'
Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1912); Barbour, Steelman Co. v.
Tompkins, 81 W. Va. n6, 93 S. E. 1038 (1917); McGraw Oil Co. v. Ken·
nedy. 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65
W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909) ; Jennings v. Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215,
8o S. E. 368 (1913); Dickey v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick Co., 69 Kan. 100,
76 Pac. 398 (1904); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, supra; Barnsdall v.
Boley, II9 Fed. 191 (1902); Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53
W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903); Hollister v. Vandergrift, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct.
Rep. (N. S.) 586 (1892); Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.) 429
(1CJ05); Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892). In determining whether a well is producing oil or gas in paying quantities in
01
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Forest Oil Company the court said: "But if the well, being down,
pays a profit, even a small one, over the operating expenses, it is
producing in paying quantities, although it may never repay its
cost, and the operations as a whole may result in a loss. Few wells
except the very largest repay their cost under a considerable time.
Many never do, but that is no reason why the first loss should not
be reduced by profits, however small, in continuing to operate."
This quotation furnishes the test to determine when a lease of this
character expires. If the production is sufficient to yield a profit,
however small, over the daily operating expenses, the lease remains
in force. On the other hand the lease terminates when this condition
no longer obtains. While this is clearly the general rule when the
"thereafter" clause includes the phrase "in paying quantities,"
there is a conflict on the question where these words are omitted.
As heretofore stated, the courts of Pennsylvania, West Virginia
and Ohio apparently hold that there is no difference in the legal
effect of a clause containing the phrase "produced in paying quantities" and one limited to the use of the word "produced." The
Supreme Court of Illinois, however, draws a distinction between
the two provisions.ss Here the lease involved was for five years
and "so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced thereon." A producing well was drilled within the definite term, but it was not
a paying well in the sense already indicated. The court said: "Oil
was produced continuously after the drilling of the well. It is true
that the quantity produced was so small as to make the venture unthe sense here used, the judgment of the lessee, if exercised in good
faith, is given great, if not controlling, weight. Barbour v. Tompkins,
supra; McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, supra; Bay State Pet. Co. v. South
Penn Lubricating Co., 121 Ky. 637, 87 S. W. II02 ( 1905) ; Summerville v.
Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (1904); Lowther Oil Co. v. MillerSibley Co., supra; Urpman v. Lowther Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433
(1903); Zeller v. Book, supra; Young v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 243, 45
Atl. 121 (1899) .
.. Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 26o Ill. 16g, ·102 N. E. 1043 (1913). In South
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,· 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. ¢1 (1912), the "thereafter" clause was restricted to the word "produced.!' fo critici~ing the holding of the Court of Appeals of West Virginia in this case, Professor Simonton observes that this decision should have been founded upon the principle
announced in the Gillespie case. "Extension of Term of Oil Lease through
Discovery of Oil in less than 'Paying Quantities.'" \VJ;ST V1~GINIA I.Aw
QuARWU.Y, Vol. 25, p. 79.
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profitable, but the strict letter of the lease was complied with, and
it had not expired by its own terms." Under this holding a lease of
this class remains in force as long as a well produces oil, even
though the oil is being produced at a loss to the lessee. This
conclusion is sound upon principle. If the lessor intends that the
lease shall terminate when it ceases to produce oil in paying quantities, such intention should be manifested by a positive stipulation
to that effect.
But the notable exception to the prevailing rule that a lease of
this type terminates at the end of the exploratory period unless at
·that time the lessee is producing oil in paying quantities is found
in West Virginia. In Soztth Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,34. the lease
was fo~ a term of ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas
should be produced, the phrase "paying quantities" being omitted.
In other words the lease was of the same character as the one considered by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Gillespie case.
Shortly before the expiration of the definite term the lessee drilled
an oil well, but the well was not producing in paying quantities at
the expiration of the stated term, or at any time thereafter. The
lessee, however, continued to pump the well at intervals, and there
was no evidence of an intention on his part to abandon the well.
The fixed term expired December 14, 1909. In the meanwhile a
paying well came in on adjacent lands, and on the 18th day of December, 1909, which was after the expiration of the specified term,
the lessee made location for a second well on the leased premises,
this being an offset to the paying well on the adjoining tract. The
statement of the case implies that it was the bona fide intention of
the lessee to proceed with the drilling of the second well. The day
the location for this well was made, however, the lessor executed a
second lease to third parties on the theory that the prior lease had
terminated through the failure of the lessee to produce oil or gas in
paying quantities at the expiration of the exploratory period. The
lessor and the junior lessee sought to oust the senior lessee, who
thereupon brought this action in equity to cancel the second lease as
a cloud on his title, and to restrain the lessor and the subsequent
lessee from interfering with his possession under the former lease.
The court stated the question in this wise: "Whether the mere discovery of oil within the term created by the lease (a) without pro"' South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, S11pra.
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duction thereof, or (b) in quantity too slight for profitable production suffices to extend the term beyond the period of ten years under the phrase "as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them
is produced therefrom by the party of the second part." Manifestly, this question was susceptible of an affirmative answer upon
the principle if:hat the extension clause was dependent upon the
mere production of oil, and not upon the production of oil in paying quantities. But the court expressly rejected this view of the
case, and founded its decision upon broader ground. After considering the reasoning of certain decisions which hold that a lease of
this type terminates absolutely at the expiration of the specific
term unless the lessee is producing oil or gas in paying quantities,8 5
the court declared that these cases accorded too much force and effect to the letter of the habendum clause, and did violence to the
spirit of ithe entire contract. The court continued: "The main
purpose of the lessor is to obtain diligent and skillful effort to make
his mines yield him a profit after the fixed term as well as within it.
If the lessee, having discovered minerals within the term or contemporaneously with it:he expiration thereof, continues operations
with diligence, he thereby obviously executes the chief purpose of
.the lease, and would be clearly within his rights if within the term.
To regard it as compliance within the prescribed condition after
the fixed term would be entirely consistent with the idea of extension or continuation of the tenancy, which is undoubtedly the major
office or function of the clause. May we not, therefore, say the
qualifying clause 'as oil or gas is produced' really means 'as long as
the premises are diligently and efficiently operated, provided the
minerals shall have been discovered within the fi:>:ed term!, which
construction harmonizes the more completely and naturally with
the manifest purpose of the parties as indicated by the other provisions of the lease, their situation, and the surrounding circum.stances." Viewing the question in this light, the court then held
that if the lessee discovers oil within the fixed term and if at the
end of such term he is continuing his search diligently, the lease remains in force as long as he perseveres in his effort to find oil or
gas. When this decision is given practical application it would sus""Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. St. 359, 44 Atl. 446 (1899); MurdockWest Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N. E. 984 (1904); Barnsdall v. Boley,
II9 Fed. 191 (1902).

182

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

tain a lease in either of the following situations: First, where the
lessee, at the expiration of the definite term, is making no effort to
produce oil from the discovery well but is diligently engaged in the
drilling of another well or in operations leading to that result; secondly, where the lessee, at the expiration of the definite term, is
producing oil, from the discovery well but not in paying quantities,
and where, at the same time, he is engaged in further operations of
the character just alluded to. This decision is contrary to the overwhelming
, weight of authority upon the question. Moreover, it is
utterly unsound in principle. In a brief dissenting opinion Judge
Robinson said: "This decision makes the contract between the parties to be other than that which they must have contemplated when
the lease was executed." This observation strikes at the heart of
the majority opinion. The fundamental error evident here lies in
the fact that the court confused the function of the drilling clat~se
wit!l. the office of the habendum clause. The sole office of the habendum clause is to fix the duration of the lease. On the other
hand, different provisions determine the measure of diligence to be
exercised by the lessee in the development of the property. As a
rule the obligation to drill during the specific term is set forth expressly. Where this is not the case, it arises by legal implication.
After the.,expiration of the fixed term and where the lease is held
by production under the "thereafter" clause, the obligation for
further drilling is usually implied. In either event the right to drill
is restricted to the term of the lease as established by the habendum
clause. Where a lease is for a definite term of years and as long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, the plain
intent of the contract is that the lease shall terminate at the end of
the definite term unless oil is being produced in the prescribed quantity. Where the lease is for a definite term of years and as long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced, it is equally clear. that the lease
sha11 terminate at the end of the definite term unless oil or gas is
being produced in some quantity. In the latter situation the lessee
would not be permitted to hold the lease indefinitely by the operation of a nonpaying well, as the law would imply an obligation requiring the lessee to conduct further operations. In brief, it is just
as reasonable to say that a lease of fixed duration without the
"thereafter" clause will remain in force after the expiration of the
stipulated term if drilling operations are then in progress, as it is
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to say that $UCh operations would extend a lease of the character
under discussion here. Such, precisely, is the view of Professor
Simonton, of the University of West Virginia, in his criticism
of this decision.36 Notwithstanding the obvious posture of this
question upon principle and authority, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in a later decision, adheres to the doctrine
of the Snodgrass case.31
·
Remembering that the lessee in the Snodgrass case was making
some effort to produce oil at the expiration of the definite term and
several days thereafter made a location for a second well which he
intended to drill until his possession was thre.atened by the lessor
and the junior lessee, this expression from the opinion is pertinent:
"Is the situation here such as may occur under any oil and gas
lease, drawn as this one was? If so, both parties must have intended an equitable and just result under the circumstances, if the terms
used will permit it, for they must be deemed to have foreseen and
contemplated it. It is matter of common knowledge that no man
can estimate the exact time within which a well can be completed,
and that delays due to accidents, trivial and grave, and other causes
beyond the possibility of accurate anticipation, will occur. Adherence to the strict letter of the extension clause would make no
allowance for any of these, and inflict disastrous losses upon diligent and honest lessees in many instances,-a consequence plainly
not within the intent of either party." This deduction is wholly unwarranted. A lease of this type by express and positive provision
contemplates the enlargement of the specific term upon one of two
clearly defined conditions: First, the actual production of oil in
paying quantities at the expiration of the exploratory period, or,
secondly, the actual production of oil or gas in some quantity at
that time. Only by doing violence to the explicit provisions of the
contyact can it be said that a mere discovery before the expiration
of the limited term and drilling operations at the time of such expiration shall have the effect of carrying the lease as long as operations are carried on. _It is true that the drilling of an oil well is attended by such uncertainty that no one can anticipate the length of
time which will ·be required to complete the undertaking. But the
answer to the situation is readily apparent. The lessee must com.. W'SST VmGINIA LAW QuARTtRI.Y, Vol. 25, p. 79"'0hio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, -W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919).
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mence his well in ample time to enable him to complete· it within the
definite term of the lease, or he must provide against the contingency which the Court describes by an appropriate term in his contract.88 The latter alternative is becoming an established custom
in the business. In Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas the following
habendum clause is very generally employed:
"To have and to hold all and singular the rights and privileges granted hereunder to and unto the lessee, its successors and assigns, for the term of five years from date hereof
(a) and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be
produced therefrom, (b) or royalties paid hereunder, ( c) or
as much longer thereafter as the lessee in good faith shall
conduct drilling operations thereon, and should production
result from such operations this lease shall remain in force
as long as oil or gas shall be produced."
It is to be noticed that the first phrase is identical with the one appearing in the lease considered in the Snodgrass case, that is, the
words "in paying quantities" are omitted. The second provision is
designed to protect the lessee in this situation. Frequently a well
producing gas will be found during the fixed term, and this will be
the only production developed. Many times there will be no market for the gas, which necessitates the shutting in of the well. As
the ordinary lease contemplates actual production for the enlargement of the term, there might be some question about the lessee's
right to hold the lease without producing the gas and yielding the
lessor his royalty. Under this provision the lessee has the right to
hold his lease after the fixed term by the payment of the gas royalty
35
In Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -, 189 Pac. 920 ( 1920), the
lessee commenced a well in ample time to enable him to complete it before
the expiration of the fixed term, but the completion of the well was interfered with by weather conditions and a shortage of water. Holding that
this was not a defense, and that the lessee should have protected himself
against these contingencies by a proper provision in the lease, the court said:
"The lessee * * * contracted positively that he would do certain work within
a certain time, and that after that time his rights in the premises should
cease unless oil or gas should be produced from 1he land. Neither was produced." Upon the basis of this holding the lease was cancelled. McLean v.
Kishi (Tex. Ch-. App.), 173 S. W. 502 (1915).
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st:.pulnted in the instrument, whether the gas is produced and marketed or not. This precise question will be treated at greater length
later. The third condition for extension meets the doctrine of the
Snodgrass case squarely. There, upon the ground of legal implication, it was decided that development in process at the termination of the exploratory period would <hold the lease as long as operations were continued. Here, by express stipulation, the lessee
has that right. The validity of this third condition is upheld in a
recent Oklahoma case.39 Here the habendum clause assumed this
form: "To have and to hold the same for and during the term of
three years from the date hereof, and as much longer thereafter as
oil or gas is found therein, or said premises developed or operated."
The lessee was not producing oil or gas at the end of the three-year
term. Shortly before this period expired he commenced the drilling of a well on the leased premises which was in process of completion at the time the definite term ended. The drilling of this .well
was proceeded with until production in paying quantities was found.
In the meanwhile, however, the lessor executed another lease to a
third party on the theory that the prior lease had expired at the
end of the three-year term. The senior lessee brought an action
in equity to sustain his title. It was urged here that the phrase "or
premises developed or operated" added nothing to the legal e:ffect
of the habendum clause, that this expression meant that the premises must be developed or operated within the three-year term
alone, and that production was the only circumstance which would
carry the lease beyond the definite term. It must be conceded .that
these words are not free from ambiguity. At any rate the alternative right of extension lacked the clearness and precision of
statement which characterizes the ·broader habendum clause first
quoted. Notwithstanding this situation, the court found that the
part!es must have had some definite purpose in view when they employed the phrase "premises developed or operated" in the disjunctive; that accordingly there were two conditions for the enlargement of the term, first, actual pro"duction at the end of the
three-year period, or secondly, development work in progress at
that time. In as much as the lessee had complied with the second
condition for the enlargement of the term, the title of the senior
lessee was upheld. Other clauses of similar import appear in the
80

Prowant v. Sealy,

JI

Okla. App. 10, 187 Pac. 235 (1920).
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books.4° Finally, then, where a lessee intends to hold his lease beyond the definite term by drilling operations alone, an appropriate
provision to that effect should be embodied in the lease.
Having considered the major questions which are involved in our
present inquiry, attention should be directed to certain matters of
inddental concern. It some times happens that a producing well is
completed on· or about the last day of the fixed term. Therefore it
is important to ascertain the exact duration of the exploratory
period. In determining this question it is held that the day the
lease is dated must be excluded from the term.41 Where a lease
covers the oil deposits alone, the :finding of natural gas within the
exploratory period will not extend the term.42 Upon the principle
that the rights of the lessee are indivisible, and where the lease
covers several different tracts of land, it is decided that the finding
of oil or gas in paying quantities on any one of the tracts covered
by the lease extends the term as to all tracts embraced within the
lease.43 In Stahl v. VanVlecle 4 .the lease was for five years and
as long thereafter as oil. or gas should be produced in paying quan'°Doornbos v. Warwick, 104 Kan. 102, 177 Pac. 527 (1919): "Five years
from date of lease and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas is found
therein or said premises developed or operated."
Myers v. Carnahan, 6r W. Va. 414 57 S. E. 134 (1!)07).: "Five years
from date of lease and as much longer as the rent for failure to commence
operations is .paid, and as long aftcr the commencement of operations as said
premises are operated for the production of oil and gas.'"
Simon v. Northwestern Ohio Gas Co., I2 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 170 (18g6):
"Five years from date of lease or as long as oil or gas shall be found in
paying quantities or the said second part31 or its assigns continue to operate
a pipeline over•or through the land."
41
Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
42
Truby v. Palmer, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. Cas. 156, 6 Atl. 74 (1886); Allen
v. Palmer, 136 Pa. St. 556, 20 A'f:l. 516 (18go).
43
Pierce Oil Corporation v. Schacht, - Okla. -, 181 Pac. 731 (1919) ;
Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E. 662 (1901); Lynch v.
Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S. E. 427 (1917); South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,
71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. g61 (1912); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed.
!?01 (1905); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, - Okla. -, 189 Pac. 540 (1920);
Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 La. g85, 74 So. 527 (1917).
"Stahl v. Van Vleck, 53 Ohio St. 136, 41 N. E. 35 (1895).
In Turner v. Seep, 167 Fed. 646 (1909), the lessee had a period of sixty
days from the termination of the lease within which to remove all material
from the lease. The lease was cancelled, and in the decree the lessee was
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tities. During. the fixed term the lessee commenced a well in ample
time to complete it before the expiration of the term. The lessor,
claiming a forfeiture, obtained an injunction restraining the lessee
from furt~er operations. While the writ was in effect the fixed
term of the lease expired. Upon appeal the writ was discharged,
and the court held that the lessee, at the close of the litigation, was
entitled to as much time to complete his well as still remained of
his term when the injunction was issued. Where it is stated ·that a
lease shall remain in force for the same length of time as a lease on
adjoining premises, it is held that the term is made definite and
certain by reference:' 5 Even though the completion of a well within the fixed term may be prevented by a shortage of water, weather
conditions, or other unexpected happenings, the lease expires at
the end of the exploratory period unless, contemporaneously therewith, oil or gas is being produced in paying quantities.46 On the
other hand, if the delay in the completion of the well within the
fixed term is attributable to the conduct of the lessor, he may be
estopped to assert that the lease has terminated.n Where a "no
term" lease provided that it should remain in force as long as oil
or gas was produced and where the lessee drilled a nonpaying well,
it was held that he had a reasonable time from the completion of the
well to resume the work of development. 48 If a lessee before the
expiration of the specific term finds gas in paying quantities in a
shallow sand he may drill the well to a deeper sand; although the
operation extends beyond the definite terms of the lease. Then if
given sixty days to remove his property. See also Midland Oil Co. v. Turner,
179 Fed. 74 (1910).
•
.. Butler v. City of Iola, 100 Kan. III, 163 Pac. 652 (1g17) •
.. Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., - Kan. -, 18g Pac. 921 (1920).
The same principle is announced in Diehl v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir.
Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 539 (1892), although.here the lessee was given the right
to complete the well, together with i:he use of an acre of ground for that
purpose, and the court held that if production were found the less.ee should
account for the royalty therefrom. This decision was based upon equitable
considerations, and. is unsound in principle.
.. Riddle v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 30, 23 Ai:l. 241 1892) ; Ohio Fuel Oil Co.
v. Greenleaf, - W. Va.-, 99 S. E. 274 (1919); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); Strange v. Hicks, II Okla. App.
369, 188 Pac. 347 (1920). Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 326
(1892) .
.. Diehl v. Ohio Oil Co., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. {N. S.) 539 (1892).
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he find production in the deeper sand his lease remains in force as
long as oil or gas is produced. If the well proves nonproductive
in the deeper sand and the lessee then proceeds to utilize the gas
from the shallow sand, the extension clause becomes effective.49
· An important question which remains is this: If a lessee completes a well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities
and then refrains from operating the well, may he still hold his
lease under the usual "thereafter" clause? The answer to this
query depends upon whether the well produces oil or gas. An oil
'vell differs from a gas well in the following particulars. Ordinarily there is a ready market for petroleum. On the other hand,
the marketing of natural gas is attended with more or less uncertainty. Unless a gas well is in the neighborhood of a city or town
utilizing natural gas, or near a gas pipeline supplying more remote
places, there is little or no opportunity to dispose of the gas production. No one will undertake the expensive operation of installing a gas pipeline until a large reserve supply of natural gas has
been developed. Until these facilities are provided a gas well must
remain idle.5<: Then, in the second place, the lessor's oil royalty
consists of a share of the production which in itself implies the continued operation of the well in order that the lessor shall receive the
benefits of his contract. In the case of gas wells, however, the
usual royalty is an annual cash rental for each well. Therefore,
should the lessee pay the stipulated rental and yet refrain from the
operation of the well, the lessor is receiving the same compensation which he would receive if the gas were being produced. For
these reasons the rule in this respect diverges. The principle is well
established that a lessee seeking to hold his lease under the "thereafter" clause must operate the oil wells on his premises with reasonable diligence. 51 On the other hand, even where the "thereafter"
clause provides that the lease shall remain in force as long as oil
.. Eastem Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 53r, 64 S. E. 836 (1909);
Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., - Okla.-, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
"'Strange v. Hicks, II Okla. App. 36g, 188 Pac. 347 (1920).
n Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 6!)0 0. S. 514 6g N. E. 984 (1904); Prowant v. Sealy, II Okla. App. IO, 187 Pac. 235 (1920); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant
Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, u8 Pac. 54 (19n). In this case it is said:
"Now the cor..tract between the parties contemplates that the lessee shall
not only explore and discover, but that if oil in paying quantities is discovered, they shall operate and produce oil, so that the lessors can have
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or gas shall be produced in paying quantities, which implies the necessity of continuous production, it is held 'that a lessee holding a
lease under a gas well alone may refrain from the operation of the
well upon the condition that he pays or tenders the stipulated gas
royalties.62
Tulsa, 0 klahoma.
(To be continued)
their share of the oil produced." In Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio Cir. Ot. Rep.
(N. S.) 429,(1905), where the operation of the property was stopped by
causes beyond the control of the lessee, the court refused to hold that the
lease had terminated.
02
Summerville v. Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 56 Atl. 876 (I904);
McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). In
Strange v. Hicks, I I Okla. App. 36g, 188 Pac. 347 (1920), however, where
the only provision for the payment of the gas royalty was conditioned upon
the use of the gas, the court held that the case was open to oral proof as
to whether the parties intended that the lease might be held by a gas well
under the "thereafter" clause 'without the actual production of gas or the
payment of the stipulated royalty. See also Herrington v. Wood, 6 Ohio
Cir. Ct. Rep. 326 (1892).

